In the early 1980s, staff of the safety department started to evaluate and attempt to rationalise the safety incentive issue. More than that, we also attempted to look at the incentive issue not in isolation, but within the context of a larger safety system which we were attempting to develop.

We also attempted to formulate strategies to meet the changing needs of the organisation in the area of occupational health & safety, in an effort to optimise improvement in safety performance. It was felt that it was imperative that employees be given the opportunity to participate in plans and strategies for improving safety performance in their particular areas. It was also felt that more 'ownership' of the respective safety issues needed to be taken, as the corporate safety system was characterised by a central head office safety function which set all corporate safety objectives and introduced their focus through all operating areas.

Through discussions, it was generally felt by staff of the Safety Section that if management and employees felt that safety was something special to be left to specialists, then the organisation would continue to rely on those 'specialists' to be responsible for safety.

In an effort to shift the existing safety 'paradigm' which existed in 1989, Newfoundland Power contracted the services of an outside consultant to bring a safety message to management and supervisory staff, and to facilitate 'planting some seeds of change'. Approaching the issue from a systems perspective, it was felt that to look at the issue of safety incentives and awards in isolation of the rest of our safety system would only result in a fragmented approach. The consultant helped facilitate a series of supervisory development sessions, targeting the key areas which were felt offered the most potential for improving Newfoundland Power's safety system.

One of the main themes of the consultants presentation was that progressive organisations who were making plans to improve safety performance were finally starting to replace safety gifts and 'incentives' with management standards for safety performance, and starting to include employees in the safety decision making and improvement process. The consultant noted that, based on his experience, those companies which continue to place a high degree of importance on their 'incentive' programs were merely continuing to rationalise deficiencies in their safety program basics.

In fact, the consultant noted that current research and experience of a lot of organisations indicated that safety awards can sometimes actually reinforce 'unsafe' performance. Some of the examples referenced focused on an individual or group who did not practice any of the principles of accident prevention, and were not contributing to the process of helping improve safety performance. Due to the fact that they may have been lucky enough not to have had a lost time injury, some recognised that achievement with an award or dinner. On the other hand, individuals or groups who happened to suffer a lost time injury didn't qualify for an award, when in fact they may have contributed quite significantly.

One particular example comes to mind which, for me, characterised the dysfunction of individual awards based on injury free work. During 1988 I was in one of our operating areas in the early new year to give out small mementos of individual 'safe' performance for the previous year. Each employee was eligible to get a glass with a company logo and the I year lost time achievement printed on the glass, providing, of course, they did not sustain a lost time injury in the previous year. Of the several individuals who did not receive a glass, one individual came up to me after the meeting and said, 'Look...I don't mind not getting a glass, but I didn't intentionally go out to try and get injured. My injury happened because it was very slippery out. If there was some way I could have prevented falling and injuring my ankle, I would have done so'. That stuck with me for a long time, to the degree that as far as our incentive program was concerned I kept asking, 'what exactly is it we're trying to accomplish with this incentive program anyway?'

This approach was not unlike that advocated by other safety professionals and some quality advocates. In his book, Total Quality for Safety & Health Professionals, F. David Pierce notes,

'Historically, we have used safety awards as carrots for worker safety. Most times these focus on workers staying injury free, not on worker safety participation. It's for this reason that these injury-free-based award programs have mixed results. Participation-based awards, such as department awards for high safety participation, are different. They can significantly build employee participation. When used, they can change of the perceptions destructive to safety award programs. That is, they bring a halt to the reward systems that depend on not having injuries and, instead, focus on involvement.' 8

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