The topic of Safety Incentives, Recognition and Awareness Programs is perhaps one of the more controversial and divisive issues which safety professionals in particular, and those with some involvement in safety generally can't seem to agree on. No mat ter who you speak with, they'll all have an opinion, success story or horror story associated with their knowledge of 'safety incentives', and they'll be all too quick to pass along their story as representative of the current thinking on safety recogniti on and incentive programs specifically, and safety management generally.
In an article in the September 28, 1989 issue of ENR magazine, the company in question was offering pizza, savings bonds and jackets to employees and groups of employees, who attained the often elusive and sometimes manipulative distinction of going lo st time injury free for one year. Some of the comments reflected in the article were:
No doubt these comments were perhaps made in a half joking manner, but I can't help believe they also reflected a great deal of truth in how the safety award system in this company operated. They are, in my opinion, a serious reflection of the dysfunct ion which characterise many safety incentive programs in North America, and indeed entire safety philosophies.
In a September, 1996 issue of Safety & Health, an article entitled, "Can Safety Be Too Much Fun?" questioned that while some safety games motivate employees to work safely, others may do more harm than good. A most interesting point in the article note
d that because of all the perceived problems associated with incentive award programs (especially the assertion that employees will not report injuries if a gift or award depends on their injury record) members of an OSHA advisory committee in the U.S. ha
ve expressed
'strong concerns that safety concerns that safety contests lead to employees not reporting work-related injuries and illnesses...part of the twist on the arguement notes that section 11(c) of the federal OSHA act, and similar provision s in each of the acts administered by the state OSHAs. provide that employees can't be discriminated against for exercising any right under the act. Since employees have the right to report that they have the right to report that they have been hurt on th e job, and games that discourage the exercise of that right could be considered discriminatory. 3 That's the theory'.
So how do you go about deciding if safety incentives and awards are right for your organisation, and if they are, how should they be structured. How do you also come to grips with recognising and reinforcing good safety performance (presumably you have definitions of "good safety performance")? If these approaches are not for you, what does this say about you and your organisation? Let's examine these issues in greater detail.
No matter who you ask, almost everyone agrees that good safety performance needs to be recognised and rewarded. On that point there is general agreement. The concept of safety incentive and recognition awards has been around in one form or another for some time, yet there is very little agreement on their value, and how best, and upon which principles to base their implementation or eradication.
There's some theoretical evidence, philosophical arguments and empirical research, yet opinions on safety recognition and incentive programs still vary, and vary dramatically. Scratch a safety professional and you'll also find an opinion on safety incenti ves underneath. The difficult part is coming up with some consistent principles, definitions or guidelines upon which to base safety reward, incentive and recognition programs. Still greater difficulty exists in proving these programs actually result in d efinitive performance improvement.
In other words, can we prove a definite cause and effect relationship? Just because a recognition or reward system is set up, and injury rates go down, does this necessarily mean that the 'program' was the direct cause, or were there other factors? Co nversely, if your injury rates and claims costs go through the roof, in spite of the fact that you may have a very comprehensive safety incentive scheme in place, what now becomes your problem and prime focus?
Recognising safety performance has existed under a number of different names for quite some time. Perhaps one of the best places to start is to examine the definitions and see if the words and understanding of the words actually mean what we think they mean.
Some refer to them as incentive programs, some call them recognition or safety awards programs Generally speaking, incentives are rewards with some strings attached - what some commonly refer to as the carrot and stick approach. The presumption is tha t if you do certain things or reach certain goals you will receive your reward. These rewards are usually financial in nature, or hold some other monetary value. Pay for performance schemes are included under these incentives programs.
Though somewhat similar, the motivational power in recognition lies mainly in its ability to appeal to an employee's sense of pride. It's the "pat on the back," the "coffee and donuts with the CEO," or the "congratulations on a job well-done" type of syst em. The important thing to remember about recognition is that different people like to be recognised differently. One persons plaque or trophy proudly displayed in the rec. room may be another persons basement junk. 4
But whatever the name, the primary objective has been the same: to recognise and reinforce safe performance. The difficult question centres around just what is safe performance? Is it no lost time accidents? Is it no accidents at all? Is it doing all t he prevention activities right, including exhibiting the 'correct' behaviours? Is it luck? Or is it a combination of all of these things?
By and large, the type of business we're in holds a fair degree of risk for many of the types of tasks which we perform. With electrical energy, you can't see it, smell it, or taste it, but we know that it's there, and the sense of touch is the one sense which our experience has shown makes a big difference in our handling of our product - electricity.
It is also with some degree of pride that we have, in our opinion, achieved some honours with respect to the benefits of a positive safety system, including being ranked as the safest utility in Canada for three consecutive years in the early '80s (based on the Canadian Electricity Association's ranking by lost time injuries) and we've been a winner of a Canadian Business Excellence Award in 1989. We won this award for the Labour/Management Co-operation Category, as reflected in improvements to our corpor ate safety performance. Now some in the Company may debate how we managed to win these awards, but the fact remains, none-the-less, that they were based on efforts directed towards improving workplace health & safety.
During the mid '70s, when safety performance at Newfoundland Power was less than enviable, decisions were made to move forward with efforts to improve. There were a number of initiatives undertaken, including what we would today call a 'best practice' eva luation of other Canadian utilities, as well as initiatives in the safety incentive area.
The prime 'target', if you will, was the one year lost-time-injury-free mark. Based on whether various sections of the Company reached the one year lost-time-injury-free mark or not, employees became eligible for various prizes, ranging from pocket knives , dinners and banquets, jackets, and including an additional days vacation, depending on how long the lost- time- injury -free period stood. As was the case in the mid to late '70s, Newfoundland Power, like many organisations, adapted various popular prac tices which were in vogue at the time, including posters and slogans to compliment the 'incentive' system.
Like most organisations, Newfoundland Power felt that employees should be rewarded for working 'safely', and working safely at that time meant no lost time injuries. I make this point, not to criticise the Company for its approach at that time, but becaus e we were doing what we felt was right, based on the information which we had available to us at that time. Hindsight is a wonderful thing; however, if we knew then what we know now, the effort perhaps would have looked much different. To compliment these so-called 'incentives', many companies in North America adopted a 'safety first' approach. Some of the more popular efforts to try and market this 'safety first' approach work was the appeal to the human or emotional side of workers.
The psychology of attempting to influence attitude and behaviour change was often designed to address the 'human error' side of the accident equation. As part of the approach to influence attitude and behaviour, many organisations, including Newfoundland Power, utilised such things as contests or awards as 'incentives' to influence safe employee behaviour. While the intention of offering dinners and gifts to employees was laudable and the objectives honourable, the problems with this type of system soon b ecame apparent.
The biggest problem was the perception that while the Company was rewarding for 'safe' performance, we had no real idea that performance (safe behaviour) was improving in any statistically reliable or measurable way, other than lost time injuries, or the frequency and severity rates which we submitted to the Canadian Electrical Association each year, to see how we 'compared' with the other utilities. Our assumption as a company was that if the 'numbers were down', something was working.
In fact, a number of things were perhaps working, and some positive things at that. We were starting to focus more on training and provide the knowledge and skill necessary to workers and supervisors to enable them to more actively participate and manage safety. We were attempting to change our corporate safety structure from one of direction by a 'head office' safety group only, to one which started to assume more ownership, responsibility and accountability for safety within their respective areas of op eration. We were making moves to attempt to develop and structure, by design, a safety culture which made safety a value for all workers and management - not simply a value promoted by the safety staff.
Essentially, we were were attempting to capitalize on the positive aspects of our existing safety culture, whicle at the same time weed out those other aspects which were preventing growth in reaching a higher level of safety maturity. In the process, we started to discover some dysfunction which threatened to contribute towards a negative and dysfunctional safety culture, if indeed it had not already done so. Some of these problems I'll explore within the context of the remainder of this presentation.
Newfoundland Power's decision at the time to implement 'incentive' awards for safety was not inconsistent with the direction of others: it was the 'thing to do' and was considered part or the way safety 'programs' were managed at that time. There has been a great deal of research and discussion on this topic over the past twenty years or so, and while many organisations continue to use prizes and awards for no lost time injuries, there still has not been any definitive correlation shown between successful safety performance and incentive awards, although those organisations who use them infer a connection. In his book, Safety Management...A Human Approach, author Dan Peterson notes, 'organisations use dinners and awards simply because it was traditional f or safety programs to use them, but in short, there was never any real foundation for using the element of safety incentives in our safety programs'. 5
Some of the most recent research, however, would suggest that 'incentive awards' are still popular. It's just that the pre-requisite for getting the rewards has been challenged for change.
One of the more recent publications is E. Scott Geller's, The Psychology of Safety. Geller puts forward a number of arguments about the human condition and human behaviour, and the basic purpose of his book, as he acknowledges, is to 'explore the hu man dynamics of occupational health and safety, and show how they can be managed to significantly improve safety performance'.
In espousing a set of some 50 'principles' for what Geller terms a 'Total Safety Culture', he notes in principle # 9 that safety incentive programs should focus on the 'process' rather than the 'outcomes'. In other words, you should reward for what peopl e do, rather that the consequences of what they may or may not have done. When we examine Geller's approach within the context of such issues as the theory of multiple causation, specifically as it relates to the causes of workplace accidents, the approac h seems to makes sense. 6
Fundamentally, this is where Newfoundland Power and people like Geller, and those who accept his philosophy, disagree. In the first place, we have not ascribed to the 'behaviourist' theory of accident prevention, based on the structured or formalized a pproach to tracking specific at risk or safe behaviours. We approach safety more from a cognitive approach, and start out with the fundamental belief that people want to do a good job - an important and challenging job - and be recognized for their effort s, both individually and collectively. But we don't belive in the buttons, balloons, bells, banners and banquest approach which perhaps might belong more to Disney Land or Las Vagas, rather than the workplace. We also believe strongly that we should be giving rewards for results, especially those things which employees and management have direct control over, not simply variations on lost time injury records or statistics, which are subject to too many variabl es for them to be adequately subject to an award program. This is not to say that what Geller and others refer to as 'process' is not important; however, we believe that it's important to measure process, but to make sure that unless our objectives or 'ta rgets' are met, the process was not effective.
As a company which has also committed to a process known internally as Corporate Effectiveness (variation on Total Quality Management). It is our corporate philosophy that
'in order to continue to meet our obligations to customers, shareholders and employees, Newfoundland Power is committed to a customer focus, systematic approach to continuous improvement in all aspects of its business. This involves a focu
s on quality and the achievement of measurable, action oriented goals in pursuit of our corporate mission and objectives'
.
As part of our internal effectiveness efforts, we have specifically identified a strong link between reaching our corporate objectives and safety. We feel that 'the effectiveness process shall compliment and support efforts aimed at improving workpl ace safety and health', and our present safety system is structured in such a way as to recognize this approach. So, while Geller may feel as he does, for his reasons, we have our own approach and focus, and feel strongly about its role in our organiz ation.
Says Geller:
'One of the most frequent common-sense mistakes in safety management is in the use of outcome-based incentive programs. Giving rewards for avoiding an injury seems reasonable and logical. But it readily leads to covering up min or injuries and a distorted picture of safety performance. The activator -behaviour-consequence contingency demonstrates that safety incentives need to focus on process activities, or safety related behaviours.7I recently consulted with a chemical plant well known for exemplary safety performance. The annual number of OSHA recordables among approximately 550 employees had varied from 3 to 10 over several years. At the start of 1995, management initiated an outco me-based incentive program to reach a 'step improvement' in safety. Specifically, 20% of a year-end bonus, amounting to $800.00 per employee, hinged on having six or fewer OSHA recordables at the end of the year. By mid-August 1995, the plant had experien ced seven OSHA recordables. Everyone lost that $800.00. Needless to say, morale for safety plummeted to an all time low. To boost spirits, employees were promised a significant surprise reward 'that will warm your hearts' if they could go the rest of the year without a single OSHA recordable.
When I visited this plant no OSHA recordable had been reported for 117 days. The plant was on its way to achieving the goal. These outcome-based incentive programs were clearly well intentioned. But I hope you're suspicious about the result. My discuss ion with employees at this facility verified that minor injuries were being covered up. In fact, one line worker remarked, 'It's only common sense, isn't it, that when you put so much pressure on a person to not have an injury, they'll be motivated to con ceal it if they can'.
Symptoms of problems with the safety incentive system at Newfoundland Power started to appear not too long after the implementation, and we didn't need a Ph. D. in psychology to realise it. With some critical evaluation, logic, and some investigative p robing, we were starting to discover that Newfoundland Power was exhibiting most of the classic symptoms of dysfunction associated with a safety incentive program based on lost time injury free criteria. Some of the problems noted included a tendency not to report, especially minor injuries; negative peer pressure associated with not wanting to break the record (this pressure became more intense as the one year mark was nearing, or multiple year marks were accumulating); the 'clinic scenario', whereby whe n an injury occurred which looked as if it might turn out to be a lost time injury, a prime motivator, so it was suggested by some, was 'saving the record' and not worker safety, or initiating accident investigations to determine how and why the ac cident happened.
In plotting injury control charts in recent years, we have discovered that we were not necessarily having less injuries - we were simply shifting some lost time injuries to medical aid injuries, as attempts to get workers back on light duty were workin g, having a net effect of 'saving the record'. Some felt this contributed towards to the development of cynicism towards certain safety activities, due to a perception that safety wasn't the issue as much as not spoiling the record.
We also attempted to formulate strategies to meet the changing needs of the organisation in the area of occupational health & safety, in an effort to optimise improvement in safety performance. It was felt that it was imperative that employees be given th e opportunity to participate in plans and strategies for improving safety performance in their particular areas. It was also felt that more 'ownership' of the respective safety issues needed to be taken, as the corporate safety system was characterised by a central head office safety function which set all corporate safety objectives and introduced their focus through all operating areas.
Through discussions, it was generally felt by staff of the Safety Section that if management and employees felt that safety was something special to be left to specialists, then the organisation would continue to rely on those 'specialists' to be respons ible for safety.
In an effort to shift the existing safety 'paradigm' which existed in 1989, Newfoundland Power contracted the services of an outside consultant to bring a safety message to management and supervisory staff, and to facilitate 'planting some seeds of change '. Approaching the issue from a systems perspective, it was felt that to look at the issue of safety incentives and awards in isolation of the rest of our safety system would only result in a fragmented approach. The consultant helped facilitate a series of supervisory development sessions, targeting the key areas which were felt offered the most potential for improving Newfoundland Power's safety system.
One of the main themes of the consultants presentation was that progressive organisations who were making plans to improve safety performance were finally starting to replace safety gifts and 'incentives' with management standards for safety performanc e, and starting to include employees in the safety decision making and improvement process. The consultant noted that, based on his experience, those companies which continue to place a high degree of importance on their 'incentive' programs were merely c ontinuing to rationalise deficiencies in their safety program basics.
In fact, the consultant noted that current research and experience of a lot of organisations indicated that safety awards can sometimes actually reinforce 'unsafe' performance. Some of the examples referenced focused on an individual or group who did not practice any of the principles of accident prevention, and were not contributing to the process of helping improve safety performance. Due to the fact that they may have been lucky enough not to have had a lost time injury, some recognised that achievemen t with an award or dinner. On the other hand, individuals or groups who happened to suffer a lost time injury didn't qualify for an award, when in fact they may have contributed quite significantly.
One particular example comes to mind which, for me, characterised the dysfunction of individual awards based on injury free work. During 1988 I was in one of our operating areas in the early new year to give out small mementos of individual 'safe' perf ormance for the previous year. Each employee was eligible to get a glass with a company logo and the I year lost time achievement printed on the glass, providing, of course, they did not sustain a lost time injury in the previous year. Of the several indi viduals who did not receive a glass, one individual came up to me after the meeting and said, 'Look...I don't mind not getting a glass, but I didn't intentionally go out to try and get injured. My injury happened because it was very slippery out. If th ere was some way I could have prevented falling and injuring my ankle, I would have done so'. That stuck with me for a long time, to the degree that as far as our incentive program was concerned I kept asking, 'what exactly is it we're trying to ac complish with this incentive program anyway?'
This approach was not unlike that advocated by other safety professionals and some quality advocates. In his book, Total Quality for Safety & Health Professionals, F. David Pierce notes, 'Historically, we have used safety awards as c
arrots for worker safety. Most times these focus on workers staying injury free, not on worker safety participation. It's for this reason that these injury-free-based award programs have mixed results. Participation-based awards, such as department awards
for high safety participation, are different. They can significantly build employee participation. When used, they can change of the perceptions destructive to safety award programs. That is, they bring a halt to the reward systems that depend on not hav
ing injuries and, instead, focus on involvement.' 8
The Canadian utilities surveyed also indicated that they all wanted to move towards a system of general recognition or promotion, rather than safety 'incentive' programs based on any pre-set quotas of accidents or injuries. At the end of the day there was no general consensus on what these 'incentive' programs should look like, as they had become entrenched in the 'culture' of the existing safety system, and eliminating the dinners and awards raised some concern among management that if we, 'took away the dinners, employees will think we don't care as much about safety'. Discussion and debate continued, without a corporate agreement on what should be done, and how it should be done. In fact, one of the main factors in helping to settle the debate on wh ether safety incentive awards should continue, and upon what basis, was the economic restraint experienced by the Company in 1993. Due in part to the cost associated with these 'recognition dinners', as they were now called in 1993, and a fiscal climate w hich resulted in salaries being reduced and some job losses experienced, the dinners appeared on their way out. With an estimated budget of some $60,000.00 for these dinners, the expenditure did not seem to justify the perceived benefit. Consequently, the decision to suspend or eliminate these 'incentive' or recognition awards was not so much a philosophical one as it was a fiscal decision.
In 1994, a corporate decision was made to examine the issue of employee communications and recognition, with the objective being to 'enhance the quality of worklife and pride in the Company by recognising employee achievement and by improving employee communications'. Through perception surveys and meetings with key stakeholders, a series of recommendations were made to deal with employee recognition, not only from a safety perspective, but in dealing with all forms of recognition. From a safety perspe ctive, the intent was to have safety recognition addressed, evaluated and dealt with on a corporate level the same way as any other type of corporate 'recognition': no more important - no less important. As a result of a corporate approach and accompanyin g recommendations, it was recommended that 'employee recognition dinners' would be held throughout the Company, and include recognition for such issues as service with the organisation, safety achievements (activities and initiatives as opposed to statist ical achievements) outstanding attendance and community involvement. This had the effect of having safety 'recognition' as a equal with any other form of recognition deemed by the Company to be important. From a 'recognition' perspective, this issue was r esolved.
In 1995, a number of key decisions were made, which mandated: fundamental changes to 'bonus' system for managerial system needed desire for a broad-based system remove link between performance rating and payout amount for managerial employees system to support Company objectives and support corporate values and guiding principles A considerable amount of research had also been conducted externally on the issue of trends in variable pay options, and clearly identified a growing emphasis on variable pay. As to why this trend was receiving additional emphasis, we identified that: it is cost effective links rewards to Company performance encourages broader participation of employees emphasises teamwork
Our research also found that plans that use 'corporate measures' had increased dramatically, as well as covering more employees. aS As a point of interest, the November/December, 1996 issue of ACA News noted that recent sturies have shown that compensa tion programs are becoming more strategic. Sandra O'Neal of Towers Perrin noted that key research findings identified that many respondents are developing or reassing total compensation strategies to ensure a closer linkage with current busienss strategy, remixing their pay to emphasize variable, performance-based components - primarily to guide behaviour, not control costs, and recognition programs are gaining new ground in helping reward - and publically extol - employee excellenc. While organizational change has been dramatic, compensation change is reported to be evolutionary, not revolutionary...At the same time, a majority are currently reassessing their compensation strategies with an eye toward modifying their rewards systems to more closely refle ct today's business realities and emerging needs. 9
As a result of our research and trend identification, it was decided to move forward with an incentive pay plan for the Company based on the following guiding principles: remuneration should include some aspect of 'incentive pay' plan based on corporat e measures and targets same measures and targets apply to all employees, union and management alike (this was a major step in the acceptance of a pay for performance scheme, especially on the part of the union - helps to break down barriers, establish tru st, develop common goals) individual performance no longer directly linked to payouts process of evaluating employee performance and providing feedback remains in place
One of the aspects of the safety component of the current incentive pay system is that the 'awards' (cash payouts) are not dependent on individual accident records or lost time accidents, or the lack of lost time accidents. We have set a target of an a ll injury frequency rate of 7.9, with a range of a high of 9 to a low of 6. There are a total of 5 corporate measures and accompanying targets for Newfoundland Power. The measures are:
Each of these measures has been 'weighted' according to importance to the Company, targets have been set, and minimum and maximum payout levels have been set. Our all injury frequency measure has been weighted at 15% of a 100% payout. Our target for 19 96 is 7.9. If we beat this target and reach an all injury frequency rate of 6.0, we will pay out 150%. If we reach our target of 7.9 we will payout 100%. The minimum level at which we will issue a payout is 9.0. If our all injury frequency rate is 9.0, we will only payout 50%. We will pay nothing if our results fall above an all injury frequency of 9.0. One of the main reasons why we have a safety measure is because it is a basic of our management system and core to our present philosophy. We reward for i t in much the same way as we reward for electrical system reliability.
Some will argue that we still have a system based on statistics, and to some degree that's true; however, there are some important points to consider. Perhaps the main reason why safety is a key target is because it is considered basic to the success o f the Company, due to the high risk nature of the work involved. It is, as some would suggest, one of the 'core values' which we have at Newfoundland Power. We have also, we believe, in the past 10 years, established a comprehensive safety management syst em whereby we measure and monitor the effort, and the quality of that effort in managing safety performance. Organisational standards for health and safety performance have also been developed (a performance document for management which outlined their ro les and responsibilities for workplace health and safety, including legislative responsibilities). We educate and train our joint OH&S committees and we have each operating area identify and set performance and 'output' safety targets to help improve safe ty performance. We are also auditing our safety system to ensure its effectiveness and compliance the legislation, and we have designed and implemented in our high risk operations a computerized 'safety management system', which monitors and measures our 'processes' from a safety perspective - it evaluates what we do, and how effective we do it. On the 'promotion' side we are still using some very traditional methods of attempting to inform and maintain employee interest in select safety issues. From a we llness perspective, we make available hat, sweatshirts, kit bags, and other promotional items to market healthy lifestyle issues. One of the main marketing issues is Canadian Occupational Health & Safety week, during which the majority of our safety promo tional items are given to employees - no strings attached: just a promotional event associated with health, safety and lifestyle issues. There are no targets to meet or no pre-requisites. COH&S week is a safety marketing opportunity.
There are a considerable number of other aspects of our safety management system which we feel is contributing to improvements in our safety performance, and lowered workers' compensation claims costs, assessed base rates and experience rates. Similar to the theory of multiple causation as a accident theory, we believe our safety performance is ultimately dictated by many factors, the least of which is safety recognition and incentives. In addition, our current focus is in keeping with the thoughts of others in the safety profession which suggest that if safety incentives are to be used, one of the most effective ways to use them is to tie them to pay. In Total Quality for Safety & Health Professionals, F. David Pierce notes, 'The last tool you can use to build participation is probably the most effective. Tie individual safety accountability to each worker's compensation program, including management and workers. So those who are highly involved in safety and keep the participation high are rewarded w ith pay increases. Pay is the most effective carrot'. 10
This is our present system. We believe in promoting safety and we belive in offering incentives to the entire workforce. We are not necessarily bound to one way of structuring our incentives schemes as much as we are perhaps opposed to some of the ways 'not' to structure a safety incentive program. There can be many ways to structure an incentive system. There are also certain fundamental issues to try and aviod when setting one up. The biggest thing we felt strongly about was to get away from the no l ost time injury target, as it was felt this target could be easily manipulated in such a way as to undermine all the positive aspects associated with a safety incentive program. In light of our own experience and the overwhelming evidence which has been d ocumented on the negative aspects of lost time injury award programs, we feel this is a good history lesson, and trust others can benefit from the experience. We believe in general awareness and promotion to 'advertise' safety issues, but we are committee d to incentives based on whether we meet our corporate targets. We belive in paying for results, but we are also interested in how we get those results.
As to whether we will maintain the current system, improve it or eliminate it entirely over the next several years, and in what capacity, I cannot say; however, our present system of incentive pay is meant to endure over the long term, and we have stru ctured it in such a way so as to reflect this long term approach. I can say, however, that whatever 'system' we decide to use of rewarding, recognising or enticing employees to improve performance, we will lobby strongly to have safety a part of that syst em in some way. We strongly believe we should not be rewarding or recognising for safety any differently than we reward for any other important issue in the Company. Our systems and programs will change and evolve as the Company changes, and is forced to change by internal and external pressures. The one constant will be the value which we place on safety. So how have we fared with the "new" system. Well, with an assessable payroll of over $38 million we are paying the lowest workers' compensation we have paid in years (.79 per $100.00 of assessable payroll) in 1996, we paid out only $15,000.00 for medical aid and lost time injuries, and we reduced our all injury frequency rate (total of lost time plus medical aid injuries) from 8.7% to 5.9%, and reduced our severity rate from a 1995 total of 869.9 to a 1996 rate of 113.5. And for our incentive pay, we paid out approximately 134% of the maximum 150%. Was our improvement the direct result of the incentive pay system. Good question, and not one to which I have a definitive answer. More than likely, it was the result of a number of factors. What did our management team feel? Well, one Regional Manager said, "There are perhaps a number of reasons why we had an exceptional year in safety, including having a safety audit performed, training, safety meetings, etc. I'd like to think incentive pa y was also part of a larger picture, and I hope that we can continue to create these incentives to enable us to manage safety better. From my perspective, it (incentive pay system) would apprer to have had some impact on safety performance." One of our Vice Presidents, John Evans noted, "Incentive compensation systems should contain some element of safety - it ensures an appropriate focus...It's also important to frequently change your approach so as not to comtribute to complacency...you hav e to keep the approach simple." So the bottom line is that we do not consider ourselves to be some lab or scientific, pseudo-psychological experiment . We think "out of the box". We live in the real world...we're not a text book case. Perhaps next year may be different. But one thing is clear. We do not believe in thinking that we know what's best for people, or that we need to create the illusion of motivation. We don't play games, with safety - or with people.
While the intentions of these recognition or incentive programs were honourable, they were often ill-designed and thought out, and were based to a large degree on the principles of behaviour modification and motivation, by individuals with just a curso ry or passing knowledge of 'behavioural' issues. The two primary approaches used in behaviour modification programs are to first attempt to eliminate unwanted behaviours which may lead to accidents or injuries, or to create acceptable new responses. While these principles may have been sound, when administered by people with only a fleeting knowledge of how these principles work, they sometimes brought the exact opposite of what they were intended to achieve. Like the saying goes, a little knowledge can b e a dangerous thing. But the real debate centres around how effective these programs are, and do they really help improve safety. There are many opinions which both support and shoot down the safety recognition theory, but what real evidence exists, and w hat is the most conclusive evidence? There are academic studies which focus on the theory of human behaviour, and there are workplaces which work with these programs.
A 1988 publication of the Canadian Centre of Occupational Health and Safety put the issue of offering incentives for safety this way: it did not argue for safety incentives one way or another. Instead, it offered an opinion on why advocates of each pos ition feel the way they do. Of those who felt safety incentives and awards were important, they noted: It is a good tool to motivate employees and to recognise them with a small gift when they worked a full year without a lost time accident. Incentives we re useful in making workers more safety conscious.
For those who felt safety incentives and awards were actually doing a disservice to the industrial safety movement, and not contributing to the benefit of occupational health and safety of workers, they argue: You cannot buy safety. It is better to hav e people feeling good, knowing they can work in a safe environment than knowing they can qualify for a prize. Any program that encourages workers to stay at work after they have been injured promotes the "walking wounded" situations and under-reporting of injuries, simply to "save the record". It doesn't promote injury reduction or accident prevention. Proper training, effective supervision and good human relations motivate more than awards. While reductions in the number of injured workers may show the b enefits of a safety incentive program, any gains in worker health and fewer occupational diseases may not readily be apparent. Difficulties arise in weighing factors related to job risk and departmental work areas, causing indifference. The effects of the se programs is to pressure workers to refrain from reporting accidents to management, for fear of "losing the record" or not getting their gift. 11
There have been numerous studies conducted on the factors which constitute effective safety management activities. One of these studies was conducted by A. Cohen and M.J. Smith of the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety, indicating:
People work more safely when they are involved directly in decision making processes. They have to be given a channel to communicate their thoughts to management and receive positive feedback. People work more safely when they have specific and reasona ble responsibilities, authority, goals and objectives with respect to identifiable safety performance standards. People are more highly motivated and work more safely when they have immediate feedback about their work.
Cohen and Smith's study indicated that among industry leaders in accident free hours, use of monetary incentives was played down, and management frequently expressed the opinion that safety contests, give-away prizes and once-per-year dinners simply di d not work. 12
Yet despite all the study, research and practical examples, there is still a difference of opinion as to safety incentives and their effectiveness. Barrie Simoneau is the Safety Director of the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Manitoba. Simonea u feels that one of the reasons why so may people use safety incentive and recognition programs is because it simply has been traditional to do so. As to why they have been a popular part of traditional safety efforts Simoneau says, " I think because peop le didn't, and perhaps still don't understand the relationship between safety, production and quality. This is something I have as a philosophy and I use it fairly often: safety performance must be a measure of success - not an analysis of failure. We ten d to measure safety performance in terms of loss - frequency, severity, damage - and we make these beautiful charts and put them in annual reports, and we say look how bad we're doing. Then we try to analyse those failures to see what the problem is. Real ly, what we need to do is rather than deal with symptoms of problems, we need to say, what is the problem, identify the problem, solve the problem, and you never need to talk about safety." 13
Jim Williams is a Senior Loss Management Advisor with Syncrude Canada Limited in Fort McMurray, Alberta. One of the reasons why Williams thinks these systems experience problems is due in part to people having some very cynical views about the whole pr ocess. Says Williams, "We have some supervisors here from the old school and they balk at this recognition thing. They say the only reason we do these things is to get points on an audit program, but that's not so. They're just from the old school." 14
There are still numerous organisations in Canada which have structured safety recognition and incentive programs in place. Peter Edmonds is the Director of Safety Engineering with the Canadian Lake Carriers Association, and is just one on many safety p rofessionals in Canada who feel recognition and reward programs are worthwhile. Edmonds notes that recognition takes place in a number of different ways within his association. Says Edmonds, "We do it in a number of ways. Each individual member company wi thin our association does it a little different. We have a couple of organisations that do plaque presentations to the ship and give jackets and all types of other incentives, and for them its working exceptionally well." 16
Another opportunity for Edmonds and his group to evaluate safety performance and give recognition comes during their audit process. Says Edmonds, "We also look, when we're doing our audits, at attitude. We sit down and talk to the crew over lunch about safety and how their attitudes are. To somebody with a skilled eye, it becomes very evident whether there's really a sincere attitude that they have about safety. We reward that." 17
Jim Williams of Syncrude believes that recognition is a prime motivator, and feels that when people get recognised for what they do, they will continue to perform positively and contribute to improving safety performance. Says Williams, "We have a numb er of different programs here. We have recognition for service, for accident-free performance, for duties above and beyond the call, as well as inter-departmental recognition for compliance to loss control program standards...We even have a bulletin board program and a large communications section, and people are recognised on the bulletin board. We also have a huge electronic sign here on which we recognise performance." Williams notes that Syncrude has also seen the benefits of the team approach to reco gnition initiatives. Says Williams, "We have monthly team meetings here where the team performance is discussed. It's a two way thing with both the team and the team leader. We also have semi-annual performance appraisals, plus the annual appraisal. All e mployees are evaluated." 18
Pat Watson is a Health and Safety Coordinator with Fisher Gauge in Peterborough, Ontario. Watson notes that they had a program some years ago that was based on lost time injuries. Numbers used to be posted on a highly visible sign or bulletin board, in dicating how many days the organisation had gone without a lost time accident. But Watson feels that effort sort of lost its appeal. Says Watson, " Right now we have no program. We have been looking at it but right now we don't have any recognition at all , other than attendance recognition." Watson does indicate that her company does do a lot of safety promotion. "We do promote safety, of course. We make the people well aware of safety and it's on the tip of the tongue of most people today in the workplac e, at least here at Fisher Gauge it is." 19 While safety professionals have some very strong views of safety recognition and incentives, so do the rank and file, as well as others. Bruce Gottzman is a Warehouse Supervisor in the Malton Distribution Centre for the Oshawa Group. Gottzman has set up a program which he calls "safety bingo". Says Gottzman, "We had a very poor lost time accident record prior to the implementation of our safety bingo program. Each employee is given a bingo card, and two numbers are drawn on a daily basis until there is a lost time injury." Prizes for a "full card" can net the winner up to $125.00. Some purists would argue that this type of "gimmick" has nothing to do with safety, nor does it improve physical conditions or behavi ours. But Gottzman is quick to give the program credit, and put it in its proper perspective. Says Gottzman, "We implemented the program in February of 1992 and we were just recently awarded the Manager's award through the IAPA for the Oshawa foods group for dramatically reducing our lost time accidents. I'm not saying that's fully due to the safety bingo, but personally speaking, I think it's a major contributing factor...It definitely created the positive peer pressure." 20
The important issue, say most safety professionals, is determining what efforts contributed to the record, and can they be documented and duplicated? Others have suggested that one of the greatest failings of these programs is that they are designed as short term cures for long term safety issues. Peter Edmonds notes that one of his biggest challenges is to find a program which has staying power. Edmonds would like to "find some way we can maintain awareness and continuity without it becoming so repeti tious that it begins to turn people off.
But Barrie Simoneau has his own thoughts about safety, awareness and behaviour. Simoneau feels that safety is nothing more than an attitude. "Everything else from there on in is production work," notes Simoneau. "Then you have to build quality into tha t production. If you have quality production you never need to worry about safety." 21
If, as Kohn suggests, these safety incentives and rewards are a means of controlling people, or are perceived as controlling people, this has some implications for safety. Geller notes that, "What Kohn - and others such as the late W. Edwards Deming an d Stephen R. Covey - are saying is this: Common safety tools such as incentives, recognition, praise and penalties do more harm than good in the long run because employees see that these tactics are a means of controlling behaviour. Feeling controlled, an employee's own inner motivation suffers". 23
The work of Alfie Kohn is frequently referenced by those who hold a high degree of scepticism and cynicism towards recognition and incentive programs. In his book, Punished By Rewards: The Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive plans, A's, Praise, and othe r Bribes, Kohn argues that carrots and sticks are ineffective at producing long-lasting attitudinal or behavioural changes in workers, and incentive and recognition programs produce nothing more than temporary 'compliance'. According to Kohn's research, s urveys suggest that at least three out of every four U.S. corporations rely on some sort of pay-for-performance program to 'motivate' employees. But Kohn also looks at some of the past and current research on the issue, and notes that some two dozen studi es from the field of social psychology have shown conclusively that people who expect to receive a reward for completing a task simply do not perforof the incentive and recognition debate centers around the fact that the key focus of these approaches deal s with people, and the behaviours of people. What's interesting about this concept is that for the most part, safety legislation in every province has as its focus the physical workplace environment. There are standards and rules and regulations governing equipment, exposure levels, machine guarding, chemical storage...the list goes on and on. Key to the legislative compliance for occupational health am as well as those who don't expect to receive anything. Additionally, Kohn asserts that in the workplace , not one controlled study, to the best of his knowledge, has ever demonstrated a long-term improvement in the quality of performance as a result of rewards. 24
If there is one piece of advice which Geller gives, it is that, "The intent must not be to control people, but to help them control their own behaviour for the safety of themselves and others. This is why the terms such as behaviour modification, disci pline and enforcement are inappropriate. They carry the connotation of outside control...The bottom line is that behaviour is motivated by consequences that are obvious and immediate." 25 The reality, however, is that these programs can eventually get cor rupted into a control process. Kohn is indeed cynical when he looks at how these "reward" programs get used in an attempt to control behaviour, as we can see by the following definitions: ac.count.a.bil.i.ty n. the process of finding someone to blame. see "Control" per.form.ance ap.prais.al n. a ritual in which individuals are judged - and reminded who has more power than they do. See "Control" per.form.ance, pay for n. selective reinforcement used to manipulate behabior and obtain compliance. See "Control" rec.og.ni.tion n. selective reinforcement used to manipulate behavior and obtain compliance. See "Control" team play.er n. someone who does that he or she is told. See "Control"
Thomas Krause and his colleagues, in their book, The Behaviour-Based Safety Process, note that behaviour, safe or otherwise can be interpreted by examining something referred to as ABC analysis (Antecedent - Behaviour - Consequence). The antecedent (an event which triggers and objectively observable behaviour ) results in a consequence of that behaviour. If the consequences of a behaviour are positive, those behaviours will be reinforced and more than likely repeated. This is why some suggest that obje ctive, observable behaviours and activities, rather than simple accident or injury statistics should be the focus of safety recognition. Focus on activities and behaviours, not attitudes. Attitudes are neither positive or negative. Their interpretation is often a matter of opinion, subjectivity and value judgement. Activities and behaviours, on the other hand, can be objectively identified, categorised, observed and measured. 26
There are any number of ingenious ways in which managers and employees can come up with to "save the record" or fix the numbers, none of them having anything to do with improving safety performance. Krause notes one of the reasons why 'incentive' award s should not be centred on injury rates is that this measure is too unreliable and subject to manipulation, thereby resulting, possibly, in dysfunction of your award program. Krause and others feel there are six very important reasons why accident data sh ould not be used as the primary indicator of safety performance: This approach is reactive rather than proactive Random variability is misread As a consequence of random variability and its negative effect, management overreacts Safety incentives based on frequency rates amount to false feedback - you may actually be rewarding unsafe behaviours which, through luck, happen to result in a low frequency or severity rate. The emphasis on frequency rates encourages mere numbers management, not improvements in policies, procedures, training or behaviour expectations. The net result of the first five factors is an erosion of the credibility of the safety effort. 28
The focus, say those who support these views, should be on day-to-day activities, not simply yearly highlights which may have been achieved through luck. More specifically, those day-to-day activities can be narrowed down to measurable 'behaviours'. We now start to move into the realm of the behaviourists, and the behaviour modification approach to safety. In other words, behaviour modification forces management, supervisors and employees to focus in on specific areas that need improvement. With a beha vioural approach to safety, the organisation: defines what types of behaviours are necessary for safe performance trains employees in safe behaviour establishes a system to observe proper behaviours uses positive reinforcement and feedback when an employe e displays those behaviours
Says Simoneau, "Clearly the focus has to be changed from frequency and severity to something which is quality. They're fine if they're used to define exemplary performance. Something that's performance-based, where you have objectives that are clearly defined - things that are specific. They're not based on having no lost time accidents. They're based on pro-active activities, of things which everybody can work together to achieve." 30
The recent shift in thinking on how to structure a performance-based safety recognition or incentive program has been due in part to the relationship which some in the safety movement have made with the total quality management movement. Jargon such as "process", "measuring performance" and "continuous improvement" have become just as important a part of the modern safety vernacular as frequency and severity used to be. Yet the emphasis on what some are calling the "process" seems to be creating more o pportunities to not only modify and influence safe behaviours, but to recognise them as well. It's been suggested that one of the strengths which a TQM approach has over a behavioural approach to safety is in the realisation that TQM, or whatever the 'buz zword' is for this improvement process, focuses on 'systematic' changes in attitude, which, in turn, result in changes in behaviour. The quality approach has its focus on safety processes, including the safety systems developed by an organisation directed towards accident prevention. Some suggest a TQM approach to safety offers more long-lasting results, but behaviour modification gives quicker impact, especially with specific, observable problems. The strength in the quality or effectiveness approach is that it emphasises employee participation, uses internal controls that reinforce both attitude and behaviour change, and has the capacity to sustain systemic safety improvement. The weakness of behaviour modification, some suggest, is that it focuses on s pecific behaviours, which may cause a company to ignore the need for an emphasis of its safety management system. 31
John Blogg would like to see a more professional focus to the issue of safety incentive and recognition programs. Says Blogg, "I think what should happen, relative to rewards, is that they should be general rather than specific. In Ontario we have the NEER experience rating and there's an opportunity for rebates. I think if you make the supervisor and the people in charge have financial accountability for the compensation record, and give them a percentage of the rebate to share among their staff, that might be a way in which management people can ensure the policies and procedures are adhered to." 32
There's no question that the possible cost of implementing these programs may be a factor which is causing some to take a second look at how much of a return on investment they actually bring. Pat Watson of Fisher Gauge notes, "Typical of companies tod ay, they're cutting back to the point where they're cutting back in every area. You're cutting your spending. Companies are on a tight budget, and obviously these things cost money."
Obviously some programs cost more than others, depending on the maturity of the approach and how deep the pockets of the corporate coffers are. Yet some programs have been so extravagant that they border on the ridiculous. John Blogg makes reference to one major Canadian corporation which had a safety incentive budget of over $500,000.00. Says Blogg, "That was just for the incentive part of the program. It included trips, televisions, winter ski outfits. It was obscene." 33
While the decision to use or not to use safety incentives or recognition is only one which can be made by you and your organisation, if you should decide they are for you there are some guidelines which should help guide your decision to make it a righ t one. In a 1989 study of safety program evaluations, researchers McAfee and Winn explained that specific rewarded behaviour may improve, while other safe behaviours may deteriorate. In contrast, if avoiding accidents is rewarded, then all the behaviours that contribute to it are also rewarded and maintained. the best solution seems to be a balance of both activities and statistical results.
E. Scott Geller offers a number of suggestions for how to go about structuring safety incentive programs, with particular emphasis on measurable observable 'behaviours' as the key to the success of the system The behaviours required to achieve a safety award should be specified and perceived as achievable by the participants Everyone who meets the behavioural criteria should be rewarded It's better for many participants to receive small awards than for one person to receive a big award The rewards shou ld be displayed and represent safety achievement. Coffee mugs, hats, shirts, sweaters, blankets or jackets with a safety message are preferable to rewards that will be hidden, used or spent Contests should not reward one group at the expense of another Gr oups should not be penalised or lose their rewards for failure by an individual Progress toward achieving a safety reward should be systematically monitored and publicly posted for all participants. 34
It's interesting to note that this type of approach being promoted by Geller and other behaviourists will work in an organisation which has adopted a behaviour-based approach to safety, where the organisation develops an inventory of 'at risk' or 'unsa fe' behaviours and samples the workplace to determine the % of safe behaviours observed on any given shift, day or week. Newfoundland Power does believe that both employee and management attitudes and behaviours impact on safety, but we have not committed to a behavioural approach, and I would venture to say this would be a difficult thing for us to achieve, based on current realities. We have opted for more of a cognitive approach to safety management, attempting to develop policies, practices, procedure s and systems which, in our opinion, make for a well-rounded safety management system. We strive to involve all levels of employees and management in the prevention process, and help ensure a positive safety climate, while at the same time ensuring legisl ative compliance and a due diligence focus. Is it the right approach? At this point in time we consider it the right approach, and right now it works for us, as we are attempting more and more to rationalise what we do, why we do it, and the benefits it w ill bring. As a company which has committed to a corporate effectiveness approach (similar in principle to TQM) we want to ensure that the direction in which we are moving as a company from a safety perspective is consistent with the direction where the r est of the organisation is going. As such, our corporate philosophy and principles from a TQM perspective states, 'the effectiveness process shall compliment and support efforts aimed at improving workplace safety and health'. At the end of the day I thin k we have a very good idea of where we want to be and how to get there.
Research which I have been able to access also suggests that the behaviourist approach to safety seems to have its roots deeply planted in the U.S., with the work of a number of American psychologists apparently seeing an opportunity to apply their tra de to the industrial safety movement. While I haven't conducted any research of my own, discussion with collegues indicate their discomfort with the word 'behaviour approach', as it is sometimes perceived as a controlling approach, based on psycological a ttempts to manipulate human behaviour. Also, a number of labour groups I have spoken with have difficulty with the behaviour modification concept, and consider this American approach to be totally inconsistent with the issues of the right to participate, the right to refuse and the right to know, as fundamental principles of Canadian OH&S safety legislation.
Do these programs produce results, and improve safety performance? When Syncrude's Jim Williams was asked this question he replied, "I can't answer that. My gut feeling is that since the day when I came here in 1977, there was no recognition. Now you'r e recognised not only for what you do but for who you are." 36
Nowhere in the legislation of any province will you see suggestions or laws aimed specifically at attempting to influence or modify individual or group behaviours. It may be implied that through training, etc. certain behaviours are expected, but tradi tional approaches to safety have a number of drawbacks. In his article on 'The Behavioural Approach', Michael Gilmore, senior partner with Safety Performance Solutions notes. 'Training alone does not always result in compliance. Just because people know h ow to do something doesn't mean that they will automatically do it that way - especially if the required behaviour seems time-consuming or unattractive. Second, the reliance on supervision as a primary motivator is often at ends with workers' desire for s elf-reliance and independence. Compliance based on supervision tends to function only when supervision is actually present. This type of traditional top-down, directive approach to safety can squelch employee empowerment by reducing perceptions of sel-eff ectiveness, personal control and optimism'. 37
The current economic crunch which is forcing most organisations to objectively evaluate the logic and rationale of all programs may just be the cloud with a silver lining for those wishing to re-evaluate the expectations for their recognition or incent ive programs, especially where there are substantial operating costs associated with the programs. Perhaps it may be the opportunity, in the words of the TQM gurus, to "do the right things, right."
Is there a balance between attempts by employers and employees to comply health and safety requirements legislation, and the ideas and strategies of those who see behaviours and key to preventing accidents? Will legislation ever keep up with the innova tions which some employers and their employers are making towards improved accident reduction and human performance? Or does the answer lie somewhere in the middle? The answer will become evident as employers and employees come to agreement on the best ap proaches which they can all equally participate in for the maximum bang for their hard earned, and increasingly precious safety budget. With all due respect to legislation and its honourable intentions, that's the reality of the workplace.
2 ENR Magazine, September 28, 1989
3 "Can Safety be too Much Fun?", Safety and Health, September, 1996, p. 27
4 Bob Filipczak, "Why No One Likes Your Incentive Program", Training, August, 1993, p. 20
5 Dan Petersen, "Safety Management...A Human Approach" (New York, Aloray Press, 1988), p. 124
6 E. Scott Geller, "The Psychology of Safety...How to Improve Behaviours and Attitudes on the Job", (Radnor, Pennsylvania, 1996) Chilton Book Company, p. 366
7 Ibid., p. 367
8 F. David Pierce, "Total Quality for Safety and Health Professionals" (Rockland, Maryland, 1995), pp. 163-164.
9 Sandra O'Neil, "Study Shows Compensation Program Becoming More Strategic", ACA News, November/December, 1996, pp. 19-20
10 F. David Pierce, "Total Quality for Safety and Health Professionals" (Rockland, Maryland, 1995) p. 164
11 COH&S (Hamilton)
12 Smith, Michael J.; Cohen, H. Harvey; Cohn, Alexander; Cleveland, Robert J. "Characteristics of Successful Safety Programs", Journal of Safety Research. Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1978) p. 9-10
13 Wayne Pardy "Winning and Losing - Ways to Reward Safety Performance", Canadian Occupational Safety, March/April, 1994, p.15
14 Ibid., p. 15
15 Ibid., p. 15
16 Ibid., p. 15
17 Ibid., p. 15
18 Ibid., p. 15
19 Ibid., p. 15
20 Ibid., p. 15-16
21 Ibid., p. 16-17
22 E. Scott Geller, "Should You Be Using Rewards", Industrial Safety & Hygiene News, January, 1995, p. 12
23 Ibid., p. 12
24 Small Business Form (Wisconsin - Winter 1994-95 issue)
25 E. Scott Geller, "Should You Be Using Rewards", Industrial Safety & Hygiene News, January 1995, p. 12
26 Krause, Thomas R.; John H. Hindley and Stanley J. Hodson, "The Behavious-Based Safety Process...Managing Involvement For an Injury-Free Culture", (New York, 1990) pp. 19-20
27 Bob Filipsczak, "Why No One Likes Your Incentive Program", Training, August, 1993, p. 21
28 Krause, Thomas R.; John H. Hindley and Stanley J. Hodson, "The Behaviour-Bases Safety Process...Managing Involvement For An Injury-Free Culture", (New York, 1990), pp. 45-46
29 Wayne Pardy, "Winning and Losing - Ways to Reward Safety Performance", Canadian Occupational Safety, March/April 1994, p. 17
30 Ibid., p. 17
31 Catherine B. Kedjidjian, "What Do Employees Think About Your Safety Program?", Safety and Health, November, 1995, pp. 42-43.
32 Wayne Pardy, "Winning and Losing - Ways to Reward Safety Performance", Canadian Occupational Safety, March/April 1994, p. 17
33 Ibid., p. 17
34 E. Scott Geller, "The Psychology of Safety...How to Improve Behaviours and Attitudes on the Job", (Radnor, Pennsylvania, 1996), Chilton Book Company, p. 178
35 Wayne Pardy, "Winning and Losing - Ways to Reward Safety Performance", Canadian Occupational Safety, March/April, 1994, p. 15
36 Ibid., p. 17
37 Michael R. Gilmore, "The Behavioural Approach", OHS Canada, November/December, 1996, p. 26